Russian Influence in Moldovan Media

Following Moldova's independence from the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has maintained significant influence over the country's media landscape. For decades, Russian state-owned television channels, radio stations, and Moscow-based newspapers have dominated Moldova's information space. The most striking example of this influence was Prime TV, which consistently led viewership ratings by broadcasting content from Russia's state channel Pervyi Kanal (1st Channel).

Russian media dominance extended to cable television, where providers' packages were overwhelmingly Russian-oriented. This influence was so pervasive that even global networks like Discovery Channel and Eurosport were only available to Moldovan audiences through Russian distribution networks, with Russian dubbing.

The print media landscape reflected a similar pattern of Russian dominance. Major Russian newspapers like "Komsomolskaya Pravda," "Trud," and "Argumenty i Fakty" led readership numbers for decades. A significant shift occurred only in 2023, when the Romanian-language newspaper Ziarul de Gardă, published in Chișinău, finally surpassed "Komsomolskaya Pravda" in circulation.

The Russian media presence began to diminish in February 2022, when Moldova's Information and Security Service ordered the closure of Sputnik's local bureau for inciting hatred during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. While authorities subsequently blocked access to Sputnik Moldova and other Russian propaganda websites, many of these outlets continue to reach Moldovan readers after having modified their domains.

According to a September 2023 analysis by the WatchDog civil society community, Russia's aggression against Ukraine and measures adopted by Moldovan authorities since 2022 to regulate the domestic media space have generated considerable changes in the population's information source preferences. The Public Policy Institute's measurement of media perception in Moldova revealed a significant decline in consumer preference for Russian or Russian-language media. While 42.9% of respondents expressed trust in Russian or Russian-language information sources in 2021, by 2023, only 27.5% of surveyed respondents still considered these sources trustworthy.

Although Russian influence in audiovisual media decreased during 2022-2024 following the suspension of several Russian television licenses in Moldova, its presence has grown stronger online, particularly on social media. In an assessment of Russian Federation involvement in Moldova's electoral processes for 2024-2025, the Information and Security Service (SIS) noted that "the information space will continue to represent the main instrument of influence, managed both at the level of Russian special services and by Moldovan socio-political actors connected to Russian factors." SIS observed an increase in propaganda channels on TikTok and Telegram, as well as anonymous Facebook pages distributing sponsored extremist content aimed at incitement, reaction testing, and evaluating supporter numbers.

Also, Russia influences the media space and political processes in the Republic of Moldova through Moldovan politicians coordinated by Moscow. An example in this sense is the oligarch Ilan Şor, sentenced to prison in the Republic of Moldova, but a refugee in Moscow. He controls at least 5 political parties and several MPs in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. The Police and the Prosecutor's Office accuse that Șor bought, with money from Russia, over 100 thousand votes in the recent presidential elections and the referendum on the accession of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union.